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Abstract
We empirically explore the influence of inflation on fiscal variables in the short, medium and 
long run, for the case of the Spanish economy, in particular to draw policy lessons for the 
design of the ongoing process of rebalancing of fiscal accounts. We focus on this topic 
through the lenses of: (i) the government budget constraint, to assess the influence of 
inflation on changes in public debt; (ii) accounting decompositions of nominal revenue and 
expenditure items into their real and price parts; (iii) a large-scale macroeconometric model 
that contains a detailed fiscal policy block; and (iv) a long-run accounting model on pension 
expenditure. 
Keywords: inflation, public finances, public debt, fiscal consolidation.
JEL classifi cation: E31, E62, H6.
Resumen
En este documento exploramos empíricamente la infl uencia de la infl ación sobre las variables 
fi scales en el corto, medio y largo plazos, para el caso de la economía española; en particular, 
para extraer lecciones de política para el diseño del proceso en curso de reequilibrio de 
las cuentas públicas. Proporcionamos evidencia basada en varios elementos analíticos: i) 
la restricción presupuestaria del Gobierno, para evaluar la infl uencia de la infl ación sobre 
los cambios en la deuda pública; ii) desagregaciones contables de los ingresos y gastos 
nominales en sus partes real y de precios para, en particular, ilustrar el efecto de determinadas 
medidas de consolidación fi scal en distintos escenarios infl acionistas; iii) un modelo macro- 
econométrico que contiene un bloque muy detallado de política fi scal, para analizar el impacto 
presupuestario y macroeconómico de shocks de infl ación, y iv) un modelo contable de largo 
plazo  (en línea con la labor de Grupo de trabajo de envejecimiento de la Comisión Europea), 
para ilustrar los efectos sobre el gasto en pensiones de distintas sendas de infl ación en el 
medio-largo plazo.
Palabras clave: infl ación, fi nanzas públicas, deuda pública, ajuste presupuestario.
Códigos JEL: E31, E62, H6.
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1 Introduction
Advanced economies currently face the challenge of understanding the economic effects of a 
low infl ation regime. In the particular case of Spain (see Chart 1), the traditional positive infl ation 
differential with the euro area turned negative since the inception of the economic and fi nancial 
crisis, and perspectives of low infl ation dominate nowadays the opinion of public and private 
analysts. The literature has recently signalled that low infl ation can challenge the operation of 
fi scal policies through a number of channels1, particularly in episodes of fi scal retrenchment.
We empirically explore the infl uence of infl ation on fi scal variables, such as government 
revenues, expenditure and debt, for the particular case of the Spanish economy. Our aim is to draw 
policy lessons for the design of the ongoing rebalancing process of the main fi scal aggregates in 
a low infl ation environment. Indeed, while Spanish public fi nances are in a correction path since 
2010, still high defi cits and debt levels are registered by the different public administrations2. In 
addition, the yields of a number of structural fi scal policy measures implemented are contingent 
on the future path of infl ation (in particular, pension reforms). We will take throughout the paper 
the current low infl ation environment as given, without entering into its possible causes3.
Against this framework, we assess, fi rst, the (short-term) infl uence of infl ation on fi scal 
adjustment strategies, in order to draw policy lessons for their design in a context of low infl ation. 
In particular, we explore the implications of different infl ation scenarios for public debt downsizing4, 
the effectiveness of public spending measures (by looking at measures designed to contain public 
wage and pension spending), and the evolution of nominal government revenues in the exit 
process from the economic crisis. To put our analysis into perspective, we compare the current 
environment with the one experienced by the Spanish economy at the time of the exit phase from 
the previous economic recession (second half of the 1990s). While now prospects are of a low 
infl ation environment, coupled with low interest rates and moderate economic growth, the 1990s 
recovery took place in a moment of more elevated infl ation rates, interest rates and real GDP growth.
Second, in order to complement the previous exercises, we provide a quantitative 
assessment of the impact of infl ation “shocks” on the main fi scal aggregates thorough the lens 
of a macroeconometric model. Certainly, the impact of an “infl ation shock” depends on the 
source of the shock, given that infl ation is a variable endogenous to the economic situation. 
Understanding the latter is crucial to evaluate the public fi nance effects of the shocks. Accordingly, 
we characterize “shocks” of different nature that push prices down by the same amount (one 
percentage point) using the Quarterly Model of Banco de España (MTBE, see Hurtado et al., 
1 See among others End et al., (2015) or Attinasi et al., (2016), and the references quoted therein.
2  See European Commission (2016). For a review of the evolution of Spanish public fi nances through the fi nancial 
crisis, see Martí and Pérez (2015).
3  A number of explanations have been provided in the literature. Factors behind the current low infl ation situation include 
some of a structural nature, like the deregulation of labour markets, the trends in cost-competition between countries, 
the infl uence of commodity prices worldwide, or the impact of technological progress (through increased competition 
by lowering barriers to entry), and others of a more conjunctural nature.
4 Trying to grasp the necessary additional fi scal effort to compensate for a low infl ation environment.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 9 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1606
2014): an internal infl ation shock and an external infl ation shock. The “internal shock” is 
engineered as a reduction in Spanish fi rms’ mark-ups, while the “external” one is modelled 
through a reduction of the price of oil in international markets. The two shocks generate very 
different responses of public sector variables.
Finally, in order to assess the medium-term impact on pension expenditure of a permanent 
low infl ation regime, we analyse the link between infl ation scenarios and the effectiveness of a 
key piece of the most recent pension reform, namely the “revaluation index” (see Ramos, 2014). 
Indeed, Sánchez (2014) states that a persistently low level of infl ation could be as harmful for the 
success of the reform (in the long term) as poor immigration and productivity.
The structure of the rest of the paper follows the description of empirical exercises 
outlined in the previous paragraphs, preceded by a section (Section 2) of a general nature, in 
which we briefl y review the main channels through which infl ation may affect public fi nances. 
Thus, in Section 3, we look at the impact of infl ation on fi scal adjustment strategies, in Section 
4, we provide a quantitative assessment of the impact of infl ation “shocks” on public fi nances 
thorough the lens of MTBE model, and in Section 5 we assess the linkage between pension 
expenditure and low-infl ation. Finally, in Section 6 we provide some concluding remarks.
SOURCES: National Statistics Institute and European Commission.
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2 The impact of inflation on public finances: main channels
In this Section we briefl y review the main channels through which infl ation affects public fi nance 
variables (see e.g. Abbas et al., 2013; Attinasi et al., 2016; Prammer and Reiss, 2015), i.e. through 
the effect on: (i) the stock of debt and market interest rates; (ii) primary public expenditures; (iii) 
tax revenues. These channels will be at the core of the operation of the simulations that we 
present in the subsequent sections of the paper.
As regards channel (i), an unexpected increase in infl ation erodes the public debt 
to GDP ratio, everything else equal, via the denominator effect that operates on outstanding 
debt issued prior to that increase (“debt erosion channel”). Nevertheless, newly issued debt is 
not affected to the extent that interest rates were adjusted accordingly, while infl ation indexed 
debts and foreign currency denominated debt are not affected either (Abbas et al., 2013). In 
the latter respect, the sensitivity of the government debt to GDP ratio to infl ation depends on 
the pass-through from infl ation to nominal (expected) sovereign interest rates. The most recent 
empirical evidence for EU countries (Attinasi et al., 2016) suggest that the short term pass 
through from long term expected infl ation to long term sovereign yields is quite high, close to 
one, thus validating the so called “Fisher effect”.
Regarding primary public expenditures (channel ii), a lower infl ation regime may affect the 
cost of the goods and services provided by the government sector, including personnel expenditure 
(public wages), and the valuation of pensions and other social transfers. In these cases, though, 
the transmission of this lower infl ation to lower public spending is not automatic, and depends 
crucially on the degree of fl exibility (indexation) of public contracts, wages and pensions.
Finally, infl ation can infl uence tax revenues (channel iii) given that tax bases are typically 
defi ned in nominal terms, as follows. 
First, if lower infl ation leads to lower nominal incomes from wages, real public revenues 
from progressive income taxes may fall insofar as nominal incomes move into lower tax brackets, 
the so-called “bracket creep” effect or infl ationary fi scal drag. The latter channels operates if 
there are no automatic indexation mechanisms. On different grounds, income tax nominally fi xed 
allowances and tax credits suffer less erosion in a low infl ation environment. 
Second, while social security contributions are typically levied proportionally on wages, 
they are also usually subject to taxable maximums, that tend to be formally or informally indexed 
to some reference variable like infl ation. Thus, the relative evolution of infl ation, wages and those 
caps, determines the effect of infl ation on revenue collection from this source. 
Third, as regards indirect taxes, VAT type taxes are levied proportionally on prices, and 
in this respect are directly affected by changes in infl ation. In turn, excise taxes are charged 
proportionally on quantities (with the exception of tobacco taxes), and as such there is no direct 
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impact on nominal tax collection from this source of revenue. Thus, in terms of its ratio to GDP, 
a low infl ation environment would erode less this type of tax collection. Along the same lines, 
recurring real estate taxation in the case of Spain is based on cadastral values, which are only 
updated at irregular intervals, instead of market values5. 
Fourth, corporate taxes in Spain are proportional to operating profi ts, and as such, no 
signifi cant effect in terms of their ratio to GDP is envisaged. Nevertheless, in Spain depreciation 
allowances, which reduce profi ts, are based on historical nominal costs, i.e. the price that was 
paid when the investment was effected and, in this case, infl ation dynamics may affect tax 
collection. In particular, a fall in prices would increase the real price of these allowances and, de 
facto, reduce the effective corporate tax rate. 
5  Other channels like tax revenue collection lags or seigniorage are of minor importance for advanced economies (see e.g. 
Prammer and Reiss, 2015, for a discussion).
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3 The impact of inflation on public finances: some accounting exercises
Following up on previous’ Section general discussion, in this one we move one-step forward and 
illustrate the potential impact of the described channels (public debt, spending, and revenues), in 
particular from the point of view of a fi scal consolidation episode and a low infl ation environment.
3.1 Public debt dynamics and inflation
We use the standard decomposition of public debt changes into its fundamental drivers (primary 
budget balance, interest payments, real GDP, the GDP defl ator and the defi cit-debt adjustment, 
see e.g. Hall and Sargent, 2010), to compare the public debt consolidation experiences of two 
periods of “fi scal stress”, namely the most recent one, and the one of the 1990s. We carry out 
this exercise because the two periods present signifi cant differences as regards average infl ation. 
While the latter was a period of moderate/high infl ation, compared to historical averages, the 
former is a period of low infl ation. Thus, the comparison provides a natural framework to illustrate 
the impact of infl ation on the adjustment process of government debt.
Let Y t be nominal GDP and let D t be the nominal value of government debt, both at 
time t. The government budget constraint accounts for how nominal interest rate i t, net infl ation 
π t, net growth in real GDP, g t, the net-of-interest defi cit as a percent of Yt, pt, and the defi cit-debt 
adjustment, DDA t combine to determine the evolution of the government debt to GDP ratio,
(1)
where the nominal yield it and the stock of debt Dt are averages of pertinent objects across 
times to maturity. A standard, approximated version, suitable for accounting decomposition of 
the fundamental determinants of debt, takes the form
(2)
With this decomposition it is possible to analyze, in particular, the sizeable impact that 
changes in prices may exert on the dynamics of the public debt to GDP ratio. In Chart 2 we 
assess these effects as well as the contribution of the other determinants described in equation 
(2), for two distinct periods of fi scal consolidation of the Spanish economy, both starting at a 
local maximum of the series of government defi cit over GDP. The upper panel starts in 1993, the 
lower panel starts in 2009, and we analyze the subsequent evolution of the debt to GDP ratio 
over 6 years. In the former period, infl ation averaged 3.6% per year while in the latter average 
infl ation was substantially lower at 1.4% per year.
The illustration is quite telling regarding the issue at hand. In the upper panel, the 
dynamics of prices allowed a reduction of the government debt to GDP ratio of above 12 
 
 Y t  
= (1 + i t – π – g t )  Y t-1
 + p t +    Y t 
D t D t-1 DDA t
Y t
  =  
(1 + π t )(1 + g t )
  
Y t-1 
+ p t +     Y t
D t 1 + i t D t-1 DDA t
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percentage points of GDP, while in the more recent, “low infl ation” episode the contribution 
of infl ation to debt reduction has been almost negligible. For the evaluation of forward-looking 
sustainability risks, the dynamics of the ratio are even more important than the level of public 
debt over GDP. Indeed in the 1990s episode the ratio of public debt to GDP already got 
stabilized at t+3, while in the most recent episode debt over GDP kept growing still over the 
defi ned t+6 window.
3.2 Inflation and the effectiveness of public spending discretionary measures
The direct, ex post budgetary savings derived from some cost cutting public spending 
discretionary measures with respect to a no policy change alternative depend on the infl ation 
scenario. In particular, when public spending measures affect items typically linked to the infl ation 
rate. For instance, in Spain public wages have been traditionally revalued, as a baseline, in line 
with expected infl ation, as defi ned by the medium term ECB target of 2%, while as regards 
pensions, the usual reference has been the current year infl ation outcome (November year on 
year growth rate). If the policy actions taken aim at breaking the link between the evolution of 
public wages and pensions with infl ation, the derived budgetary savings would certainly be more 
relevant in a high infl ation environment.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
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We simulate the savings derived from an adjustment of public wages per employee 
commensurate to that implemented over 2009 2014 in Spain, vis à vis two benchmark growth 
alternatives, namely a 2% yearly rate (in line with the traditional infl ation reference for public 
wages) and the current-year infl ation rate (that averaged 1.4% over 2009 2014). As regards 
discretionary measures, over that period, public wages were frozen year by year, and in addition 
in 2010 there was a 5% nominal cut across the board (see Martí and Pérez, 2015). The results 
are presented in Chart 3. The cumulated differential savings of these measures with respect to 
the 2% benchmark amounts to 14.3 bn euro, which is a number close to 1.5% of Spanish GDP. 
This is almost 2.7 bn euro (0.3% of GDP) of larger than in the ex post observed case of 1.4% 
average infl ation growth. This shows that such measures, defi ned in nominal terms, deliver less 
budgetary savings in a low infl ation environment.
3.3 Public revenues and inflation
In this section, we explore the limits to tax collection that may exist in a low infl ation environment 
despite a perceived real recovery of the economy. As explained above, the effect on tax revenues 
of low infl ation would be different for different taxes, depending, inter alia, on the degree of 
progressivity of the public revenue item. 
We break down standard nominal tax bases for the different revenue items into a “real” 
and a “price” part. This approach requires, fi rst, the identifi cation of the appropriate nominal tax 
base for each revenue item (VAT; income tax; corporate tax; social security contributions), and, 
second, the separation of its approximate real and defl ator parts. The latter may involve the use of 
estimation methods in the cases in which the decomposition of nominal macroeconomic variables 
into their real and defl ator parts is not available. We follow the standard approach in the extant 
literature to approximate macroeconomic bases (see e.g. Morris et al., 2009, or Leal et al., 2008).
As regards VAT, we take as nominal tax base private households’ consumption, 
households’ investment, tourism revenues, and general government intermediate consumption 
and investment. As the average defl ator of these components, we take the GDP defl ator, and 
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
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then compute the real component as a residual using the nominal tax base. Regarding Stamp 
Duties, we take as its tax base housing investment, taking its defl ator as the measures of prices. 
As to other indirect taxes, we approach the evolution of those bases by private consumption, 
and the decomposition follows the real-defl ator decomposition of the national accounts.
With respect to direct taxation, we approximate the tax base of personal income taxes 
by compensation of employees, non wage household income, including interests and dividends, 
minus actual social contributions paid to the general government, and adding social payments. 
As regards corporate income taxes, national accounts tax bases are more diffi cult to identify. We 
take, as it is standard in the literature the gross operating surplus of fi rms. The defl ator is estimated 
from the income side of GDP. Finally, as an approximation of social security contributions we take 
compensation of employees and non employees. As regards personal income taxes and social 
security contributions, the real component is estimated by the number of taxpayers, workers and 
social benefi ts’ benefi ciaries in the former case and workers in the latter.
In Chart 4 we present the decomposition of such tax bases into their real and defl ator 
part. We focus on a couple of examples. First, as regards VAT out of the 4.9% growth in 1996, 
close to 50% was due to the real part and the other 50% to the price part, while in the fi rst year 
of recovery from the latest recession the nominal growth of tax bases took place in a framework 
of falling prices. Second, as regards the two lower panels of the chart, wage moderation, that 
partly refl ects low infl ation, explains why tax collection on the verge of the late 2013 recovery has 
remained relatively subdued.
Nevertheless, the relevant object from the point of view of the fi scal adjustment is the 
impact on the government revenue to GDP ratio, not just on the nominal value of government 
revenues. From the latter point of view, the fi nal effect would depend on the net impact on the 
numerator (nominal public revenues) and the denominator (nominal GDP). Related to this point, 
one may wonder if infl ation forecast errors are behind forecast errors in planned government 
revenue to GDP ratios. In particular, a relevant question is to what extent negative news on 
government revenues could be related to lower-than-expected infl ation rates. The latter is a 
complex question that would deserve a deep analysis that goes well beyond the aim of the 
current paper. In any case, as a fi rst, extremely tentative approximation, we run the following 
simple regression:
(3)
Where R t denotes government revenue, and as described above Y t is nominal GDP, π t 
the infl ation rate (GDP defl ator) and g t the real growth rate of GDP. A hat over a given variable 
denotes a forecast. Thus, we relate forecast errors in the dynamics of the ratio of the government 
revenue-to-GDP ratio to forecast errors in infl ation and economic growth. The series of forecasts 
are computed by combining real-time forecasts from international organizations (European 
Commission, IMF and OECD) and offi cial (government) plans. We compute monthly series that 
( Y t  –  Y t-1 ) – ( Y t  –  Y t-1 ) =  (π t – π^   t ) + (g t – g^   t ) +  tR t-1R t R tR t-1
^ ^
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1606
refl ect in each month the latest available forecasts (for the current year and one-year-ahead), 
taking the perspective of the external analyst that processes incoming sources of forecast by 
informed agents. We run the regressions at the quarterly frequency (forecasts are averaged over 
the 3 months of a given quarter) over the period 1999Q1 2014Q4.
 
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
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4 Quantitative assessment of inflation shocks on public finances
In the previous Section we have illustrated the infl uence of infl ation and “infl ation shocks” on 
certain public fi nance variables, from a general point of view. However, the nature of the “infl ation 
shock” is crucial to assess the impact on public fi nances. In this regard, in this section we use 
the Quarterly Macroeconometric Model of Banco de España (MTBE, see Estrada et al., 2004., 
and Hurtado et al., 2014) to simulate the public fi nance effects of two different “infl ation shocks”. 
Both push prices down by one percentage point, but are engineered through different channels: 
(i) an internal infl ation shock (Spanish fi rms reduce their markups); and (ii) an external infl ation 
shock (the price of oil in international markets goes down).
The MTBE is a large-scale macro econometric model used for medium term 
macroeconomic forecasting of the Spanish economy, as well as for evaluating the staff 
projections and, as will be the case here, for performing scenario simulations: we change some 
exogenous variables (markups and oil prices) and see how endogenous variables react. The 
model is specifi ed as a large set of error correction mechanism equations, and, especially in the 
short run, is mostly demand driven. 
The main results of our simulations are presented in Table 1. In the simulation of an 
internal infl ation shock, fi rms reduce their mark-ups, which makes HICP and the GDP defl ator 
fall by approximately the same amount (the size of the simulation is calibrated so that HICP falls 
by exactly one percentage point on the fi rst year). This has positive effects on GDP, through two 
channels: on one hand, with lower prices, households have a higher real disposable income, 
so they increase their consumption and housing investment; and on the other hand, as goods 
produced in Spain now have a lower price, exports grow. With higher demand, fi rms invest more 
and hire more workers, which further increases income for households and demand for fi rms, so 
second-round effects reinforce and expand the initial fi rst-round positive effects on GDP.
However, the total increase in real GDP is much less than 1%, so nominal GDP falls following 
this shock, and, because of this, nominal receipts of the public sector fall (the biggest impact is on 
direct taxes to fi rms, but direct taxes to households and indirect taxes also fall sharply in nominal 
terms). On the expenditure side, there is a very moderate fall because the economic expansion 
reduces unemployment benefi ts, but all other expenditure items remain mostly unchanged6.
The net effect on the public sector balance is negative but very small (the defi cit is 
slightly higher in the fi rst year because revenues fall faster than expenditures, but even this effect 
dies out in the medium term). Nevertheless, even with a very small effect on the public defi cit the 
debt-to-GDP ratio clearly worsens following this internal defl ationary shock since the nominal 
GDP has fallen.
6  Pensions are kept constant because we impose the assumption that the indexation channel is shut down in these 
simulations, consistently with the results that will be presented in Section 4. Relieving this assumption and letting 
pensions react to infl ation does not alter the main results of this exercise.
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The simulation of an external infl ation shock is also calibrated so that HICP falls by 1% 
in the fi rst year (oil prices fall by 24%, from 77 to 58 euros per barrel), but in this case the effects 
on public-sector variables are completely different. For a start, in this case the direct effect on 
the GDP defl ator is approximately zero: there is no internal production of oil, so the price of 
goods produced at home is not hit directly by the shock. Even the second-round effects on 
the GDP defl ator are approximately zero with the estimated coeffi cients of MTBE (in fact, if 
anything, they are positive: the defl ationary effect on wages and internal prices is estimated to 
be very small, and is dominated in the medium term by the  also not particularly big  infl ationary 
effect of higher demand).
The competitiveness channel through which lower infl ation improved GDP after a fall 
in mark-ups is almost non existent in the case of oil prices, because this is an international 
shock that also affects our trading partners. The increase in GDP is due only to the higher real 
IMPACT OF LOWER INFLATION ON THE MAIN MACROECONOMIC AND PUBLIC SECTOR VARIABLES TABLE 1
Cumulative level differences, %
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Prices
        0.1-        0.1-        0.1-        9.0-        0.1-        0.1-PCIH    
        1.0        1.0        0.0        8.0-        8.0-        9.0-rotalfed PDG    
Real variables
        6.0        5.0        2.0        4.0        4.0        2.0PDG    
        2.1        9.0        4.0        6.0        5.0        2.0noitpmusnoc etavirP    
        9.0        7.0        3.0        3.1        0.1        5.0tnemtsevni evitcudorp etavirP    
        6.2        1.2        1.1        1.1        0.1        6.0tnemtsevni gnisuoH    
        1.0-        0.0        0.0        4.0        4.0        2.0stropxE    
        2.1        9.0        4.0        9.0        8.0        4.0stropmI    
Nominal public sector variables
        5.0        3.0        0.0        2.0-        3.0-        4.0-stpicer LATOT    
        0.1        7.0        3.0        3.0-        4.0-        6.0-sdlohesuoh ot sexat tceriD        
        2.1        0.1        5.0        0.1-        1.1-        7.1-smrif ot sexat tceriD        
        5.0        3.0        1.0        0.0        1.0-        1.0-snoitubirtnoc laicoS        
        3.0        0.0        5.0-        4.0-        4.0-        7.0-sexat tceridnI        
        1.0-        1.0-        0.0        0.0        0.0        0.0serutidnepxe LATOT    
        0.0        0.0        0.0        0.0        0.0        0.0noitpmusnoc cilbuP        
        0.0        0.0        0.0        0.0        0.0        0.0tnemtsevni cilbuP        
        2.0-        0.0        0.0        2.0        1.0        0.0stnemyap tseretnI        
        8.1-        2.1-        5.0-        1.1-        8.0-        3.0-stifeneb tnemyolpmenU        
        0.0        0.0        0.0        0.0        0.0        0.0srefsnart laicos rehtO        
Primary balance (% of GDP, difference)  
        2.0        2.0        0.0        1.0-        1.0-        2.0-)ecnereffid ,PDG fo %( ecnalaB
Public debt (% of GDP, difference)
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
??????????????? ????????? ???????) ??????????????? ???????????????????
-0.2       -0.1        -0.1        0.0        0.1        0.2        
0.7        0.6        0.6        -0.2        -0.6        -1.0        
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disposable income of households, who increase their consumption and housing investment after 
the shock7. Firms face higher demand, so they invest more and hire more workers, generating 
second round effects that are similar to the ones described for the previous simulation.
In this case nominal GDP clearly rises (real variables grow, the GDP defl ator does not 
change), which makes nominal government receipts grow as well (mainly through direct taxes to 
fi rms, but also direct taxes to households and social contributions; indirect taxes initially fall, then 
restore their original level). In turn, unemployment benefi ts again drive a very small fall in public 
sector expenditures. Summing up, there is a slightly positive effect on the budget balance, 
and a sizeable fall in the debt to GDP ratio, because of the slightly lower defi cit but even more 
importantly because of higher nominal GDP.
These two simulations highlight the importance of taking into account the sources of 
low infl ation when assessing its impact over the public fi nances. We have chosen to show the 
effects of two shocks that generate an identical fall in the HICP but also a similar rise in GDP. 
Despite those similarities the effect on public fi nances turns out to be markedly different: they 
deteriorate if the low infl ation comes from a fall in markups, but they improve if it comes from a 
fall in oil prices.
7  This channel is actually stronger now: the positive effect on real GDP was smaller in the previous simulation because 
after the fall in mark-ups fi rms pass smaller profi ts on to households, which is not the case after the fall in oil prices.
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5 The effectiveness of the most recent pension reform in a low inflation regime
In this Section we explore the impact of changes in infl ation assumptions in an accounting model 
of pension expenditure estimation along the lines of European Commission (2015), as done 
by Ramos (2014). A recent strand of pension reforms in Spain provide a natural framework to 
assess their effectiveness depending on the infl ationary regime.
Spain is no exception in the gradual ageing of the population foreseen in the demographic 
projections available for most developed countries, with the corresponding pressure over 
pension systems. Indeed, in recent decades Spain has undergone a radical demographic 
transformation, characterised by a sharp fall in the birth rate, higher life expectancy, and a shift 
in net migration, which was highly positive in the years of the economic expansion (from 1997 
to 2008) but has been negative since 2009 (see Ramos, 2014). Furthermore, since the Spanish 
pension system is pay as you go, the economic crisis has made evident the accumulation of 
imbalances, as the demographics driven increase in pension expenditure was coupled with a 
sharp fall in the number of contributors.
5.1 The “revaluation index” of pensions
With a view to counteracting the impact of these demographic shifts, in recent years various 
pension reforms have been passed in Spain. For the purposes of this paper, the most 
relevant one is the reform enacted at the end of 2013, in particular the establishment of 
a new revaluation index. Under the later, pensions have been adjusted on a year by year 
basis according to the performance of variables pivotal to the Social Security system, such 
as revenue, expenditure and the number of pensions, replacing the former system, in force 
since 1997, which linked pensions to CPI infl ation8. The revaluation index is obtained from the 
budget constraint on the pension system, that is, from equating revenue to expenditure in year 
t+1, and decomposing expenditure into three components: revaluation, number of pensions 
and the substitution effect. 
Specifi cally, the revaluation index works as follows9:
RI t+1 = g
–   r,t+1 – g
–   p,t+1 – g
–  s,t+1 +  [       E t+1        ]                                                             (4)
Where RI t+1 is the revaluation index, i.e. the amount by which pensions grow between 
years t and t+1. The variables that come into play in the calculation, from left to right, are: the 
rate of change of the revenues of the Social Security System (g–  r,t+1 ), the rate of change of the 
8   Quite importantly, the 2013 reform also regulates the so-called sustainability factor. From 2019, starting pensions will 
be automatically linked to the increase in life expectancy. For further details, see Ramos (2014).
9 See Ramos (2014) and De la Fuente and Domenech (2013) for additional details and references.
R t+1 – E t+1
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number of pensions (g–  p,t+1 ), the substitution effect (g
–  s,t+1 )
10 and a component that adjusts for 
imbalances that may arise between Social Security revenue (R) and expenditure (E). When the 
difference between revenue and expenditure is positive, this component adds to the revaluation 
of pensions, while if it is negative it reduces it. The imbalance between revenue and expenditure 
is multiplied by parameter , which measures the speed at which the imbalances are corrected. 
The extant legislation stipulates that a value of  equal to 0.25 is to be used, which means that 
in each year 25% of the imbalance between revenue and expenditure is corrected. 
Quite importantly, all these components of the right hand side of the formula are not 
included in as current year values, but via 11 year averages centered on t+1. This allows for 
smoothing of the year to year rates of revaluation and mitigates the effects of the business cycle. 
In any case, the result of the formula just described does not yield automatically the 
revaluation of pensions in year t+1, as the law establishes both a fl oor and a ceiling, which will 
be crucial for the purposes of this paper. In particular, the revaluation cannot result in a pension 
increase, which is lower than 0.25% or higher than a rate equal to infl ation plus 0.5%.
5.2 Some simulations
The simulations are based on the latest Ageing Report of the European Commission (see 
European Commission, 2015). Social security revenues and the demographic path are given, and 
the pension expenditure path, in turn, is determined by the above-described formula determining 
pension increases. The model is comprehensive enough to account for the main features of the 
social security system, from an accounting point of view. Agents’ reaction to the policy path 
(reform) and the evolution of minimum pensions are not refl ected in the exercise. Moreover, the 
simulations are based on a non-policy scenario environment, meaning it is assumed that there 
are no changes to the different parameters of the system, in particular on the revenue side. The 
simulations are not to be considered as long-term forecasts, given dependence on exogenous 
assumptions and the uncertainty surrounding them, but rather as an illustration of how the 
revaluation formula works in different scenarios, particularly for infl ation. 
The main assumptions of the simulations are shown in Table 2, together with the main 
outcomes of the exercises. From 2015 revenues are set to the expected outturn of that year, 
namely 10.9% of GDP, while the rate of change of new pensions is linked to the rate of change 
of average wages. The number of pensions gains speed as of the decade of 2020 due to the 
retirement of baby boomers (Chart 5a and 5b). Pension expenditure and the average pension 
are obtained endogenously.
10   This is defi ned as the increase in the average pension in a year in the absence of any revaluation that year. That is 
to say, the increase in the average pension that comes about owing to the fact that the pensions of new pensioners 
are usually higher than the pensions of pensioners who die and abandon the system. In this way, the substitution 
effect depends on the number and amount of pensions of new pensioners relative to the number and amount of the 
pensions of pensioners exiting the system. It is estimated that the substitution effect would currently stand at around 
1.0%. This component enters the formula with a negative sign, meaning that the revaluation index is smaller in order 
to counteract the upward pressure on expenditure due to the amount and number of new pensions.
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With the basic assumptions outlined above, and under the revaluation index, pensions 
would grow with the fl oor over the simulation horizon (see Chart 5a), although slightly above 
between 2020 and 2028. This is due to the fact that at the beginning of the simulation horizon the 
imbalance of the Social Security system inherited from the crisis dominates the formula. Then, 
in the twenties, the rate of growth of revenues is higher enough to compensate the increase in 
the number of pensions and to gradually correct the defi cit. But then, as of the decade of the 
2030, demographic pressures hit and the defi cit widens again. Under this simulation, despite 
the fact that the infl ation rate in the baseline AWG averages 1.7% over 2016 2024 and 2% as of 
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
a Demographic varibles and Social Security revenues are taken as exogenous. Projections rest mainly on 2015 Ageing Report assumptions. Pensión expenditure 
????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
b Including other Social Security expenditure.
c Invariant assumption across scenarios.
d Average wage grows 3.3% on average, according to 2015 Ageing Report.
PENSION EXPEDITURE SCENARIOS (ACCOUNTING SIMULATIONS) TABLE 2
2015 2016-2024 2025-2050 2050
Revaluation index (ageing scenario) (a)
 71.21 45.11 42.11 99.11PDG fo %)b( erutidnepxe noisneP    
 7?.01 7?.01 7?.01 7?.01PDG fo %)c( seunever ytiruceS laicoS    
PDG fo %ecnalab ytiruceS laicoS   -1.13  -0.3?  -0.67  -1.30  
%etar noitalfnI    -0.47  1.74  2.00  2.00  
 52.0 13.0 54.0 52.0%noitaulaver xedni egarevA    
 01.23 69.93 7?.25 01.75oitar)d( egaw egareva / noisnep egarevA    
 ?2.0 00.2 96.1 4?.0%)c( snoisnep fo rebmun fo htworG    
    Growth of initial pension before sustainability factor
 77.0 5?.0 ?9.0 00.1rotcaf)c( rotcaf ytilibaniatsuS    
    Growth of initial pension after sustainability factor (b)
????????? ??????????????? ??????????????? ?
 31.11 10.11 ?1.11 99.11PDG fo %)b( erutidnepxe noisneP    
PDG fo %ecnalab ytiruceS laicoS    -1.13  -0.31  -0.15  -0.27  
%etar noitalfnI    -0.47  2.41  3.00  3.00  
 56.1 77.0 10.1 52.0%noitaulaver xedni egarevA    
 ?2.92 43.?3 55.25 01.75oitaregaw egareva / noisnep egarevA    
 00.0 00.0 00.0 00.0)oiranecs %52.0 noitalfni( xedni noitaulaveR
 31.61 10.41 ?5.11 99.11PDG fo %)b( erutidnepxe noisneP    
PDG fo %ecnalab ytiruceS laicoS    -1.13  -0.72  -3.14  -5.27  
%etar noitalfnI    -0.47  0.57  0.25  0.25  
 52.0 52.0 52.0 52.0%noitaulaver xedni egarevA    
 9?.24 62.?4 94.45 01.75oitaregaw egareva / noisnep egarevA    
????????? ??????????????????????????????? ?????
 76.31 94.21 ?4.11 99.11PDG fo %)b( erutidnepxe noisneP    
PDG fo %ecnalab ytiruceS laicoS    -1.13  -0.61  -1.62  ????1  
 00.1 00.1 29.0 52.0%snoisnep fo noitaulaver egarevA    
 02.63 51.34 99.35 01.75oitar)d( egaw egareva / noisnep egarevA    
????????? ??????????????????????????????? ?????
 73.61 ?2.41 7?.11 99.11PDG fo %)b( erutidnepxe noisneP    
PDG fo %ecnalab ytiruceS laicoS    -1.13  -1.00  -3.41  -5.50  
 00.2 00.2 1?.1 52.0%snoisnep fo noitaulaver egarevA    
 35.34 62.94 ??.55 01.75oitar)d( egaw egareva / noisnep egarevA    
    % 0.11  ???5  3.50  3.5?  
% 0.11  2.15  2.72  2.90  
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2025, pensions are set to grow most of the years at 0.25%. Given that in the model wages are 
assumed to grow in line with nominal productivity, the ratio of average pension to average wage 
falls from 0.57 in 2015 to 0.32 in 2050 (see Table 2). Thus, the ratio of pension expenditure over 
GDP evolves from 12.0% in 2015 to 12.2% in 2050, increasing just 0.2 pp of GDP over that 
period, despite the adverse demographics.
The importance of the infl ation regime for the application of this revaluation index 
formula is clear when comparing this baseline simulation with other two scenarios11. First, an 
infl ationary scenario where the infl ation rate is supposed to increase steadily by 3%, affecting 
nominal variables but without an impact on real variables. In this case, Social Security revenues 
(linked to nominal GDP) allow for a revaluation of pensions close to 2% in the twenties and by 
2050, while the substitution effect still pushes the revaluation index to the 0.25% fl oor in the 
middle of the simulation horizon (see Chart 5b). Nevertheless, the ratio of the average pension to 
11  In these alternative scenarios, real variables are the same as in the baseline scenario (same number of pensions, same 
number of employees, etc.). Nominal variables are changed in line with new prices (higher GDP, higher nominal SS 
revenue level, higher wages, etc.).
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the average wage falls to 0.29 in 2050, while the ratio of expenditure to GDP is in 2050 11.1%, 
a level below the starting point of the simulation, 2015.
On the contrary, if the infl ation rate is supposed to remain at 0.25%, the outcome is a 
smaller fall in the ratio of the average pension to the average wage, to 0.43 in 2050, as pensions 
do not lose purchasing power each year. The downside of this is that the ratio of pension 
expenditure increases signifi cantly between 2015 and 2050, by 4.1 pp of GDP. This result makes 
evident that there is always a tradeoff between the ratio of the average pension to the average 
wage, on the one hand, and the ratio of pension expenditures to GDP, on the other.
These simulations show that, even with the same basic rule for calculating the 
revaluation of pensions, different infl ation scenarios result in very different outcomes in terms of 
the purchasing power of pensions (ratio of average pension to average wage in 2050 ranging 
from 0.29 to 0.43, with 0.32 on the baseline scenario). In addition, these infl ation scenarios also 
lead to signifi cant differences in the total cost of the pension system, i.e. the ratio of pension 
expenditures to GDP in 2050 ranges from 11.1% to 16.1%, with 12.1% in the baseline scenario.
An alternative way to gauge the importance of infl ation is to change the revaluation 
of pensions in the basic scenario. In this case, a fl oor to the revaluation of pensions of 1% per 
year would push up the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP to 13.7% by 2050 (12.2% in the 
basic scenario) while the ratio of the average pension to the average wage to fall to 0.36 (0.32 
in the basic scenario). However, if the fl oor of the revaluation of pensions is supposed to be 2% 
per year, the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP would be 16.4% by 2050 (12.2% in the basic 
scenario) while the ratio of the average pension to the average wage would fall to 0.4 (0.32 in 
the basic scenario).
In any case, in all the scenarios presented here, the Social Security system would 
remain in defi cit for the whole period. This defi cit reaches  1.3% of GDP in the baseline scenario, 
and  5.3% of GDP in the scenario where infl ation is 0.25% per year. 
In addition to the accounting simulations provided above, it is worth mentioning that 
some recent work by Sánchez (2014) also highlights the importance of the infl ation regime on 
the outcomes of pension reforms. The latter author uses an overlapping generations model to 
analyse the effectiveness of recent pension reforms in Spain, and he concludes that persistently 
low levels of infl ation could be as harmful for the success of the reform (in the long term) as poor 
immigration and productivity.
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6 Concluding remarks
We empirically explore the infl uence of infl ation on fi scal variables in the short-, medium- and 
long-run, for the case of the Spanish economy, in particular to draw policy lessons for the 
design of the pending process of rebalancing of fi scal accounts. Indeed, while Spanish public 
fi nances are in a correction path, still high government defi cits and debt levels are registered 
by the different public administrations. In addition, the yields of a number of structural fi scal 
measures implemented are contingent on the future path of infl ation, and the nature of infl ation 
shocks/regimes. In this paper, we look at these issues through the lenses of: (i) The government 
budget constraint, to assess the infl uence of infl ation on changes in public debt; (ii) Accounting 
decompositions of nominal revenue and expenditure items into their real and price parts; (iii) A 
large-scale macroeconometric model, that contains a detailed fi scal policy block; (iv) A long-run 
accounting model, on pension expenditure (along the lines of the works of the AWG).
Our main fi ndings are as follows. First, we fi nd that during the recent episode of fi scal 
consolidation, discretionary fi scal policy measures yielded less adjustment due to the situation of 
lower infl ation. This applied to debt reduction strategies, both as regards government revenues 
and expenditures. In addition, public debt dynamics were signifi cantly more adverse than in the 
higher-infl ation episode of the second half of the 1990s when the stabilization of government 
debt was supported by favorable GDP and infl ation dynamics. Second, we illustrate how the 
impact of low infl ation on public fi nances depends crucially on the source of the infl ation shock 
hitting the economy, with some external shocks (a fall in oil prices) presenting even a positive 
impact over public fi nances, while internal price shocks (a decrease in mark-ups) still have the 
potential of worsening public debt to GDP ratios. Finally, in our pension-accounting model we 
show how different infl ation regimes crucially determine the effects of the major pension reform 
of 2013, measured by the long term dynamics of the ratios of pension expenditure over GDP 
and average pension over average wage. In this sense, and assuming there are not changes 
in other parameters of the system (in particular, revenues), we fi nd that, given the revaluation 
scheme in place since 2013, a regime of lower infl ation would keep the average pension closer 
to the average wage, but would increase the cost of the pension system as a share of GDP. 
Along the same lines, a higher infl ation regime would assure sustainability by keeping the ratio 
of pension expenditure to GDP close to current levels but could lead to a potential problem of 
insuffi ciency of public pensions.
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